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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This Title VII case involves an interpretation of a consent 
order that removed a residency requirement for municipal 
employees. 
 
In 1989, the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People, its New Jersey State Conference, and its 
Newark and Jersey City Branches, filed suit in district 
court against the City of Bayonne, New Jersey. The NAACP 
alleged, inter alia, that Bayonne unlawfully discriminated in 
hiring municipal employees, principally police officers and 
firefighters, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. SS 2000e-2000e-17 (West 1994 & Supp. 
1997) by requiring its employees to reside in Bayonne. 
 
Bayonne is a "civil service" municipality 1 and hires 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. SS 11A:9-1 and 11A:9-2, a New Jersey 
municipality can choose whether or not it wants to be subject to the 
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employees for competitive positions (police andfirefighters) 
on the basis of their performance on a state-wide civil 
service examination administered by the New Jersey 
Department of Personnel.2 Applicants for non-competitive 
positions are not hired on the basis of their performance on 
an examination. 
 
On January 31, 1991, the parties entered into a 
stipulation and order settling the lawsuit. Bayonne agreed 
to suspend its residency requirement and to affirmatively 
recruit African American applicants. The stipulation expired 
in four years, but Bayonne remained under a continuing 
obligation to ensure that its recruitment and hiring 
practices were lawful and nondiscriminatory. 
 
Four years later, in May 1995, because the removal of 
the residency requirement failed to increase--and in the 
case of police officers decreased--the representation of 
African Americans among its workforce, Bayonne reinstated 
the residency requirement. The NAACP sought injunctive 
relief. In a bench trial, the district judge denied the request 
for injunctive relief, finding the NAACP failed to establish a 
causal nexus between the residency requirement and its 
allegedly disparate impact on African Americans. The 
NAACP now appeals.3 
 
We hold the district court was not clearly erroneous in 
concluding the NAACP failed to prove the residency 
requirement unlawfully discriminated against African 
American applicants for police and firefighter positions. But 
the district court made no finding with respect to Bayonne's 
hiring for non-competitive jobs, which do not require a civil 
service examination. We will affirm in part and reverse in 
part. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
state's Civil Service Act. 
 
2. The NAACP has not made the New Jersey Department of Personnel a 
party to this lawsuit and is not challenging the legality of the 
examination. 
 
3. The Honorable H. Lee Sarokin presided over this matter in 1991. After 
Judge Sarokin was appointed to this court, the matter was assigned to 
the Honorable William H. Walls, United States District Judge for the 
District of New Jersey. 
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I. 
 
Bayonne4 hires its municipal employees in accordance 
with New Jersey's Civil Service Act, N.J. Stat. Ann. S 11A:1- 
1 et seq. (West 1993 & Supp. 1996). New Jersey has two 
divisions of civil service jobs: competitive and non- 
competitive. N.J. Stat. Ann. S 11A:3-2 (West 1993). Civil 
service regulations require that candidates for competitive 
positions, including police and fire-department jobs, apply 
through the New Jersey Department of Personnel. For these 
jobs, the New Jersey Department of Personnel administers 
examinations and promulgates a list of eligible candidates 
based on the results of the examination. N.J.A.C.S 4A:4-1.1 
(1995); S 4A:4-4.2 (1995). The New Jersey Department of 
Personnel ranks the candidates on the list, called a 
certification, in order of their test scores. N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 11A:4-1 (West 1993); N.J.A.C. S 4A:4-3.2 (1997). When 
Bayonne wants to hire workers for competitive positions, it 
requests a list of a number of candidates sufficient to 
satisfy its hiring needs. N.J.A.C. S 4A:4-4.1 (1996). The New 
Jersey Department of Personnel then selects an appropriate 
number of candidates from the master list in accordance 
with the residence requirements of Bayonne and forwards 
the certification to Bayonne. N.J.A.C. S 4A:4-3.2. After 
receiving the certification, the municipality-- for the first 
time in the process -- learns the names, addresses and 
rank of eligible candidates. At the same time, the New 
Jersey Department of Personnel notifies eligible candidates 
they have been certified and instructs them to inform 
Bayonne if they are interested in the job. N.J.A.C. S 4A:4- 
4.2(b). If a candidate indicates his or her interest, Bayonne 
commences its own screening process to ensure that the 
candidate meets the age, citizenship, health and character 
standards established by state law and is otherwise suited 
to serve.5 Otherwise, with limited exceptions not applicable 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Bayonne is located in the southern end of Hudson County, New 
Jersey, bordered on the north by Jersey City. Newark lies ten miles 
away. African Americans make up 4.7% of Bayonne's population. African 
Americans make up 14.4% of the population of Hudson County and 
40.6% of neighboring Essex County. 
 
5. Candidates for the police and fire departments must also submit to a 
drug test, a thorough background check, a physical examination, and an 
interview with the chief of the police or fire department. 
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here, Bayonne must hire the candidates in the exact rank 
order presented by the New Jersey Department of 
Personnel. N.J.A.C. S 4A:4-4.8 (1996). 
 
Candidates for non-competitive entry level positions, 
such as laborer and clerk typist, are hired directly by 
Bayonne. Most electrical and blue collar positions are 
promoted from the laborer and clerk typist level. Certain 
non-promotional, non-uniform positions are classified as 
open competitive and are filled from certified lists created 
by the New Jersey Department of Personnel. Many of these 
jobs traditionally have been filled on a provisional basis 
while the New Jersey Department of Personnel posts the 
vacancies and certifies a list of eligible candidates based on 
examinations. Frequently, although not always, the 
provisional appointee is appointed on a permanent basis. 
See J.A. at 1.27. 
 
Before 1991, Bayonne limited its municipal hiring to 
Bayonne residents only, an option permitted by the Civil 
Service Act. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 40A:9-1.3 (1993) 
(Municipalities may "require [that] . . . all officers and 
employees employed by the local unit . . . be bonafide 
residents therein."). 
 
As we have noted, on February 20, 1990, the NAACPfiled 
suit in the United States District Court for the District of 
New Jersey against Bayonne, asserting its residency 
requirement unlawfully discriminated against African 
Americans in violation of Title VII. Before trial, the parties 
settled the case by entering into the stipulation. The 
stipulation provided that Bayonne "shall not engage in any 
employment practice which unlawfully discriminates 
against individuals on the basis of their race in recruitment 
or hiring or in other terms and conditions of employment." 
J.A. at 2.5. The stipulation articulated its purpose: "to 
ensure that the recruitment and hiring practices of 
Bayonne are lawful and non-discriminatory, and to ensure 
that no one is unlawfully disadvantaged by its recruitment 
and hiring practices." Id. 
 
Under the stipulation, Bayonne, without admitting 
wrongdoing, promised to: (1) replace its "Bayonne- 
residency" requirement with a "New Jersey-residency" 
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requirement for police officers and fire-fighters;6 (2) 
affirmatively recruit African American applicants; and (3) 
refrain from discriminatory employment practices in the 
future. Recruitment efforts included "paid radio and 
newspaper advertising and outreach in Newark, East 
Orange, and Jersey City, with the goal of attracting black 
applicants in numbers reflecting their availability in the job 
category being filled." J.A. at 2.5-2.16. 
 
Bayonne remained under a continuing obligation to 
refrain from discriminatory recruiting and hiring practices. 
The stipulation provided that "[a]t the conclusion of four (4) 
years from the date this Stipulation is executed . .. the 
requirements of this Stipulation shall cease to bind 
[Bayonne] . . . except that [Bayonne] . . . shall continue to 
ensure that the recruitment and hiring practices of 
Bayonne are lawful and non-discriminatory." J.A. at 2.16. 
In the event of Bayonne's non-compliance, the NAACP 
could enforce the stipulation upon "a clear and convincing 
showing that defendant's failures or omissions to meet the 
terms of this stipulation were not minimal or isolated but 
were substantial." J.A. at 2.14. During the four-year term, 
the NAACP never availed itself of this provision. 
 
On March 8, 1991, Bayonne amended its residency 
ordinance in accordance with the terms of the stipulation. 
Bayonne also increased recruitment efforts aimed at African 
Americans. The record demonstrates that the Bayonne 
Police Department engaged in an extensive program to 
recruit Bayonne residents for the civil service examination 
which included outreach to African Americans living in 
Bayonne. In addition, the Deputy Chief of the fire 
department led an intensive effort to recruit and train 
Bayonne residents, particularly African Americans, for 
firefighter jobs. J.A. at 1.11-1.12, 1.35. 
 
It is uncontested, however, that after four years, minority 
representation did not increase. Significantly, as the NAACP 
stated both in the district court and in oral argument 
before this court, minority representation among police 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. For other positions, the stipulation provided that Bayonne merely had 
to relax its residency requirement. Non-residents who took municipal 
jobs had to move into Bayonne within six months of their employment. 
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officers actually decreased. The record demonstrates that 
the number of African American candidates referred by the 
Department of Personnel to Bayonne for police positions 
decreased from 3.4% to 1% during the moratorium.7 
 
On May 3, 1995, "having concluded that the stipulated 
settlement with appellants did not increase the number of 
the City's black employees," Bayonne reenacted its 
residency requirement.8 Brief of Appellee at 13. As noted, 
on May 9, 1996, the NAACP asked for temporary and 
permanent injunctive relief, claiming Bayonne's 
reinstatement of the residency requirement violated the 
stipulation's prohibition against future employment 
discrimination. 
 
The district court reopened the case and on July 8, 1996, 
denied the NAACP's application for a preliminary 
injunction. Subsequently, in November 1996, the district 
court conducted a bench trial. The parties submitted 
extensive stipulations of fact, and the NAACP presented 
witness testimony. Much of the NAACP's evidence was 
statistical, including the following:9  
 
       - Bayonne is approximately 4.7% African American. 
       Hudson County is approximately 14.4% African 
       American, and neighboring Essex County is 
       approximately 40.6% African American. 
 
       - Of the employees hired during the four-year 
       moratorium, 2.6% of the non-residents were African 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We cannot make a similar comparison for firefighters because the 
parties have not provided us with statistics on Bayonne's hiring before 
the residency requirement was lifted. The parties' joint appendix does 
tell us from 1992-1995, 97 persons were certified to Bayonne as eligible 
for employment as firefighters. Bayonne rejected one, 3 declined 
appointment, 10 failed to respond to the notice of certification, and 9 
asked to be deferred for later consideration. Of the 81 hired, 2 (2.5%) 
were African American. J.A. at 1.22-1.23. 
 
8. The residency requirement became effective May 24, 1995. 
 
9. These statistics were compiled in various years. We specify the years 
only when relevant. 
 
                                7 
  
       American, and 5.5% of the Bayonne residents were 
       African American.10 
 
       - During the four-year moratorium, the percentage of 
       newly-hired police officers who were African 
       American decreased. In February 1990, 3.4% (5 of 
       145) of those listed as eligible for police employment 
       were African American, and 20% (2 of 10) of those 
       hired were African American. In comparison, in 
       January 1992, 8.2% (77 of 933) of those listed as 
       eligible for police employment were African 
       American, and 1.1% (4 of 362) of those certified for 
       hiring were African American. After the moratorium 
       expired, in September 1996, 6.6% of newly-hired 
       police officers were African American. 
 
       - In Bayonne, 14.3% of employees of large, private- 
       sector employers are African American. In Hudson 
       County, 17.2% of employees of large, private-sector 
       employers are African American.11 
 
       - 11.1% of New Jersey's civilian labor force is African 
       American. 21.2% of New Jersey's government 
       employees are African American. 
 
The NAACP also offered expert witness David Griffin, who 
analyzed statistics, compared the racial composition of 
Bayonne with both the surrounding counties and the entire 
State of New Jersey, and opined that the residency 
requirement was discriminatory. 
 
After hearing the NAACP's evidence, the district court 
granted Bayonne's Motion for Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 52(c).12 The court found the NAACP failed to prove a 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. African American representation in Bayonne's municipal workforce 
was 3.5% before the four-year moratorium. The NAACP contends during 
the four-year moratorium, 5% of the municipal employees hired were 
African American. J.A. at 1.13-1.14. But the NAACP does not use this 
statistic in its briefs in support of its prima facie case. And at trial, 
the 
NAACP's expert stated that he "would be surprised if that [difference] 
was statistically significant." J.A. at 1.207. 
 
11. The parties obtained these numbers from reports of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission on the racial composition of 
private employer establishments with over 100 employees. 
 
12. Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(c) provides, in relevant part: "If during a trial 
without a jury a party has been fully heard on an issue and the court 
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causal nexus between Bayonne's residency requirement 
and the low percentage of African American municipal 
employees. The district judge ruled orally: 
 
       I am constrained to dismiss this case because there is 
       no factual basis for what we have had by way of 
       opinions given by the plaintiff's expert, David Griffin, 
       an expert in labor market analysis. 
 
       As I discussed with [plaintiff's counsel] Mr. Rose and 
       I incorporate by reference, we have an order entered 
       January 31, 1991 by the then District Judge Sarokin 
       approving and incorporating therein a stipulation by 
       the parties. Originally the Newark Branch of the 
       NAACP, together with other branches of the 
       organization had brought suit against the City of 
       Bayonne alleging and claiming that under Title VII, 
       that the members of the plaintiff and members of the 
       black race in general had been discriminated against in 
       employment by the municipality of Bayonne. 
 
       The stipulation sought to resolve the differences by the 
       parties and between the parties by providing that a 
       residency requirement, which had been the main 
       thrust of the complaint by the plaintiffs against the 
       defendant, would be removed, and it was so done in, I 
       believe, March 1991. 
 
       Thereafter, for the life of the stipulation, which was 
       four years from the date of execution by Judge 
       Sarokin, there was no such residency requirement. 
       During that period, the hope for an increase in black 
       municipal government employment, it is agreed, did 
       not improve. 
 
       It should be also noted that during this period there 
       has been no history, through the plaintiffs anyway in 
       their case, of there being any complaint by the 
       plaintiffs of any failure of the defendant municipality to 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
finds against the party on that issue, the court may enter judgment as 
a matter of law against that party with respect to a claim or defense that 
cannot under the controlling law be maintained or defeated without a 
favorable finding on that issue...." 
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       abide by the terms of the stipulation, although there 
       was a mechanism for such overview and review with 
       the Court having jurisdiction retained to it to entertain 
       any criticisms of what was being done or not being 
       done by Bayonne. 
 
       In any event, we have had for the last day and a half 
       evidence produced by David Griffin primarily which 
       consists, with all due respect, of statistical possibilities 
       relying upon data wherein he assumes that Hudson 
       County is the employment market by which 
       comparisons shall be made as to whether blacks are 
       being disparately impacted by the residency ordinance 
       that was recently reinstated by the municipality of 
       Bayonne in the spring of this year, 1996. 
 
       With due respect to the doctor, his opinions, as he 
       admits in one circumstance, are nothing more than his 
       expression of common sense. They are speculative. 
       They involve speculative contingencies and possibilities 
       without any evidential basis. I can't be more specific 
       because he was not more specific. 
 
       He speaks about the failure of blacks to be hired, but 
       there is no evidence as to why they were not hired. He 
       speaks of the non-seeking of employment with Bayonne 
       by blacks and being much lower than that in 
       surrounding Hudson County towns, but we have no 
       evidence as to why that is. And regardless of how 
       important and how vital the purpose of Title VII is, it, 
       too, just like any other law is dependent upon factual 
       evidence from which judges and lawyers and parties 
       can make meaningful decisions. That is the problem 
       with this case, we have no factual evidence. 
 
       We have well intentioned statistical platitudes. For 
       example, much is made of a 1996 police employment 
       examination, which has a small number of persons of, 
       as I said, the black race, as being qualified, but that 
       list was not prepared nor administered, nor reviewed 
       by the defendant in the municipality. It was prepared 
       by the New Jersey State Department of Personnel, so 
       to try to speak of visiting discrimination, whether 
       intentionally or inadvertently or institutionally, at the 
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       doorstep of the municipality is not warranted factually, 
       and that is why I dismiss this case, because there is 
       nothing to support it factually. 
 
J.A. at 1.251-1.255. The NAACP now appeals. 
 
II. 
 
The district court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331 and 1343 (1993) because this case arises under 
Title VII, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. S 1291 
(1993). 
 
The district court found the NAACP failed to meet the 
burden imposed by the stipulation of demonstrating non- 
compliance because it did not prove the residency 
requirement caused a disparate impact in hiring. Causation 
presents a question of fact. Kachmar v. Sungard Data Sys. 
Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 1997); Thomas v. City of 
Omaha, 63 F.3d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 1995) (reviewing Title 
VII causation determination as a finding of fact). 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) dictates the 
appropriate standard of review. In a bench trial, the court 
"shall find the facts and state separately its conclusions of 
law thereon" and those "[f]indings of fact... shall not be set 
aside unless clearly erroneous." Id. The NAACP requests 
application of a plenary standard of review. But the 
applicable authority holds that the district court's findings 
of intentional discrimination or disparate impact shall be 
reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. See 
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 566 
(1985) ("In Pullman Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273 (1982), 
we held that a district court's finding of discriminatory 
intent in an action brought under Title VII . . . is a factual 
finding that may be overturned on appeal only if it is clearly 
erroneous."); Villanueva v. Carere, 85 F.3d 481, 485-86 
(10th Cir. 1996) ("[W]e may reverse the trial court's finding 
of no discriminatory intent only if it is clearly erroneous 
. . . . [T]his standard of review [is] well established."); 
Bernard v. Gulf Oil Corp., 890 F.2d 735, 739 (5th Cir. 1989) 
("The standard of review for such a decision is whether, 
looking at the record as a whole, the district court was 
clearly erroneous in its determination that there was no 
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purposeful discrimination and that the action resulting in 
disparate impact was justified by legitimate business 
reasons.") (citation omitted); Keyes v. Secretary of the Navy, 
853 F.2d 1016, 1019 (1st Cir. 1988) ("A district court's 
finding concerning intent in an employment discrimination 
action is a factual finding within the `clearly erroneous' 
rubric.") (citation omitted); Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, 
Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 702 (8th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). 
 
Of course, this case lies one step removed from a 
traditional Title VII analysis. The district court evaluated 
whether Bayonne fulfilled its obligations under the 
stipulation to refrain from employment practices that 
violated Title VII. Focusing on Bayonne's performance 
under the stipulation, the district court assessed whether 
Bayonne complied and made factual findings. We review 
factual findings for clear error. 
 
Harrison v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson 
County, 80 F.3d 1107 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. 
Ct. 169 (1996) supports this standard of review. In 
Harrison, a discharged public employee filed a contempt 
citation against his former government employer, alleging it 
failed to comply with a stipulation resulting from race 
discrimination litigation. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit applied the following standard 
of review when examining the district court's finding of 
contempt: 
 
       In order to hold the defendants in civil contempt, a 
       district court must find that the plaintiff established by 
       clear and convincing evidence that the defendants 
       violated the court's prior order. In fact, eachfinding of 
       a violation of the order must be supported by clear and 
       convincing evidence. . . . We review the district court's 
       finding of civil contempt for an abuse of discretion. A 
       district court may abuse its discretion when it relies on 
       clearly erroneous findings of fact. 
 
Id. at 1112-13 (citations omitted). 
 
Accordingly, we review for clear error. 
 
       Under this standard, a finding is `clearly erroneous 
       when the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left 
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       with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake 
       has been committed.' This standard does not permit 
       the reviewing court to conduct a de novo review of the 
       evidence, but it does allow the court to consider 
       whether there is enough evidence in the record to 
       support the factual findings of the district court. This 
       review is more deferential with respect to 
       determinations about the credibility of witnesses, and 
       when the district court's decision is based on testimony 
       that is coherent and plausible, not internally 
       inconsistent and not contradicted by external evidence, 
       there can almost never be a finding of clear error. 
 
United States v. Igbonwa, 120 F.3d 437, 440-41 (3d Cir. 
1997) (citations omitted), petition for cert. filed (Oct. 23, 
1997) (No. 97-6518).13 
 
III. 
 
We must "examine the language of the [stipulation] to 
determine the obligations and duties undertaken by the 
various parties." Vulcan Pioneers, Inc. v. New Jersey Dep't 
of Civil Serv., 832 F.2d 811, 814 (3d Cir. 1987). The 
language of the stipulation is clear: Bayonne "shall 
continue to ensure that the recruitment and hiring 
practices of Bayonne are lawful and non-discriminatory." 
The parties agree this clause requires Bayonne to comply 
with Title VII, 42 U.S.C. S 2000e-2(a), which makes it 
unlawful to "limit . . . applicants for employment in any 
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual 
of employment opportunities . . . because of such 
individual's race . . . ." Title VII prohibits not only 
intentional discrimination, but also "disparate impact" 
discrimination, i.e., "employment practices, adopted without 
a deliberately discriminatory motive, [which] may in 
operation be functionally equivalent to intentional 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The NAACP maintains the district court failed to make the requisite 
findings of fact. Under Robinson v. Lehman, 771 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1985), 
the district court must set forth findings of fact sufficient to allow 
"the 
appellate court, on review, [to] ascertain the basis for [its] decision." 
Id. 
at 780. Except with respect to Bayonne's hiring of non-competitive 
employees, the district court satisfied this requirement. 
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discrimination." Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 
U.S. 977, 987 (1988). 
 
In order to establish a prima facie case of disparate 
impact discrimination, the plaintiff must demonstrate that 
application of a facially neutral standard has caused a 
"significantly discriminatory hiring pattern." Newark 
Branch, NAACP v. Town of Harrison, 940 F.2d 792, 798 (3d 
Cir. 1991). See also Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. 
Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989) (holding plaintiffs must 
"demonstrate that the disparity they complain of is the 
result of one or more of the employment practices that they 
are attacking here, specifically showing that each 
challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact on 
employment opportunities for whites and nonwhites."). The 
evidence in these cases usually focuses on statistical 
disparities. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 798. 14 
 
To prove causation through statistical evidence alone, the 
statistics must be "of a kind and degree sufficient to show 
that the practice in question has caused the exclusion of 
applicants for jobs or promotions because of their 
membership in a protected group. . . . [S]tatistical 
disparities must be sufficiently substantial that they raise 
such an inference of causation." Watson, 487 U.S. at 994- 
95. See also McNeil v. McDonoush, 648 F.2d 178, 182 (3d 
Cir. 1981) (causation will be proven only if the statistics do 
not require speculation by the court). The Supreme Court 
has emphasized that the statistics must be relevant to the 
discrimination alleged. See Hazelwood School Dist. v. United 
States, 433 U.S. 299, 313 n.20 (1977). "The`proper 
comparison [is] between the racial composition of [the at- 
issue jobs] and the racial composition of the qualified . . . 
population in the relevant labor market.' " Wards Cove, 490 
U.S. at 650-51 (citations omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. Once the plaintiff proves its prima facie  case, the burden shifts to 
the 
defendant to prove a business justification for the challenged practice. 
It 
is then up to the plaintiff to discredit any business justification 
asserted 
(or to suggest a viable alternative to the challenged practice which would 
reduce the disparate impact). Harrison, 940 F.2d at 798. Burden shifting 
never occurred in this case, because the court held plaintiff failed to 
prove its prima facie case. 
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The district court found the statistical evidence offered by 
the NAACP was insufficient to prove causation. 15 
Specifically, it held the NAACP did not prove the residency 
requirement discriminated against African Americans. At 
oral argument the NAACP conceded the New Jersey civil 
service examination was a likely cause of the disparity.16 As 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in 
considering a challenge to an employment test: 
 
       The plaintiffs contend that th[e] disparity results both 
       from testing and the use of subjective criteria, yet they 
       offer no method from which this Court can ascertain 
       whether a significant part of this disparity results from 
       testing. The plaintiffs simply have not shown that 
       testing, independent of other factors that may affect 
       the racial balance of the workforce, is causally related 
       to discrimination in the number of blacks hired or 
       promoted. The causal requirement recognizes that 
       under representation of blacks might result from any 
       number of factors, and it places an initial burden on 
       the plaintiff to show that the specific factor challenged 
       under the disparate impact model results in the 
       discriminatory impact. The plaintiffs, by failing to 
       isolate the discriminatory effect of the practice they 
       challenged, did not meet this burden. 
 
Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183, 189-90 (5th 
Cir. 1983). 
 
The NAACP contends it has proven causation. Although 
its position is not entirely clear, it seems to make two 
separate arguments. First, the NAACP argues the residency 
requirement reduces the percentage of African Americans 
on the list of eligible candidates. Responding to the district 
court's request to produce its best evidence, counsel for the 
NAACP said: "If [Bayonne has] the residency requirement 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The NAACP contends the district court improperly held statistics are 
an improper form of evidence. We disagree. The district court held that 
the statistics in this case were insufficient, and expressed no opinion 
whether they constituted "proper" evidence. 
 
16. Counsel for the NAACP acknowledged, "Clearly the test has a 
disparate impact, no question about it." The NAACP argues that 
although the test is one cause, the residency requirement is another. 
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they hire from the 6 percent black list. If they don't have 
the residency requirement, they might hire from an 11 
percent black list or 15 percent black list." 17 J.A. at 1.238. 
By referring to the "list," the NAACP apparently means the 
list of applicants who took and received a passing grade on 
the law enforcement examination administered by the New 
Jersey Department of Personnel in January 1996. 18 
 
But this argument ignores the process by which Bayonne 
selects police officers. That 15% or 30% of those taking and 
passing the test are African American bears little 
relationship to the racial composition of the list of 
candidates ultimately certified to Bayonne. Except for the 
residency requirement, Bayonne does not have control over 
the list. The New Jersey Department of Personnel certifies 
the list to Bayonne, ranking the applicants in order of their 
test scores. N.J. Stat. Ann. 11A:4-1; N.J.A.C. 4A:4-3.2. 
With limited exceptions not applicable here, Bayonne 
cannot choose from a "pool" of qualified candidates but 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. In its brief, the NAACP argues that Bayonne would have hired police 
officers in 1996 from a list of eligibles that was over 30% African 
American if it had no residence requirement. 
 
18. As we have noted, statistics often form the basis of the prima facie 
case in disparate impact cases. See Harrison, 940 F.2d at 798 (citations 
omitted). In Wards Cove, the Supreme Court emphasized that "the 
`proper comparison [is] between the racial composition of the [at-issue] 
jobs and the racial composition of the qualified ... population in the 
relevant labor market.' " 490 U.S. at 651 (citations omitted). The Court 
noted the possibility of using other statistics. See Id. at 651 
("Alternatively, in cases where such labor market statistics will be 
difficult if not impossible to ascertain, we have recognized that certain 
other statistics--such as measures indicating the racial composition of 
`otherwise qualified applicants' for at-issue jobs--are equally probative 
for this purpose."). And this court has looked to other statistics in 
disparate impact cases, see Green v. USX Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 805, but 
not when more probative statistics were available. The NAACP cites no 
authority, and we can find none, that supports the use of these 
particular statistics to set out a prima facie case of disparate impact 
discrimination under Title VII, particularly where the NAACP had 
available to it and made use of the labor market statistics that form the 
proper basis of a disparate impact case under Wards Cove. We express 
no opinion on whether under the appropriate circumstances such 
statistics can form the proper basis of a prima facie case under Title 
VII. 
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must hire the candidates presented by the New Jersey 
Department of Personnel according to rank. N.J.A.C. 4A:4- 
4.8. Bayonne cannot waive civil-service requirements for 
any applicant for a job governed by the civil service system. 
N.J.A.C. 4A:10-2.1. Significantly, when Bayonne removed 
the residency requirement, the number of African American 
candidates referred to it did not increase and even 
decreased. The NAACP acknowledges that African American 
representation on the certified list decreased. As noted, the 
record demonstrates that the number of African American 
candidates referred by the Department of Personnel to 
Bayonne for police positions decreased from 3.4% to 1% 
during the moratorium.19 
 
The NAACP's second argument involves a comparison 
between the racial composition of what it asserts to be the 
labor market and the racial composition of Bayonne's 
workforce. While defining the relevant labor market 
precisely is usually necessary, we can also look to the 
general population of the Bayonne area if it is an adequate 
proxy.20 See Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 651 n.6 (citations 
omitted) ("[W]here `figures for the general population might 
. . . accurately reflect the pool of qualified job applicants,' 
we have even permitted plaintiffs to rest their prima facie 
cases on such statistics. . . .").21  We found statistics on the 
general population sufficient to prove causation in Harrison, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. As we have noted, the parties have not provided us with similar 
comparative statistics for firefighters. According to the parties' joint 
appendix, however, from 1992-1995, of the 81 firefighters hired, 2 (2.5%) 
were African American. J.A. at 1.22-1.23. 
 
20. The district court characterized the NAACP's definition of Bayonne's 
labor market as "speculative." As our analysis will show, we do not need 
to decide whether the NAACP properly defined the labor market. 
 
21. We assume arguendo that the general population of the greater 
Bayonne area is the relevant labor market. But we note that looking to 
the general population is not necessarily sufficient in situations like 
this 
one where the claim involves jobs with "special qualifications". See 
Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-308 (1977) 
("When special qualifications are required tofill particular jobs, 
comparisons to the general population (rather than to the smaller group 
of individuals who possess the necessary qualifications) may have little 
probative value."). 
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940 F.2d at 792, where the NAACP sued the Town of 
Harrison claiming its residency requirement excluded 
African Americans from municipal employment. The Town 
of Harrison is similar to Bayonne -- it contains a low 
percentage of African American residents, and it sits in 
Hudson County. Following a bench trial, we upheld 
judgment for the NAACP, citing with approval the district 
court's reasoning: 
 
       [t]he geographical areas from which Harrison draws 
       employees includes its own County of Hudson as well 
       as Bergen, Essex and Union counties. . . . It would be 
       hard to conclude that among the very substantial 
       number of black workers in the four county labor 
       market there are not large numbers of persons 
       qualified to serve as police officers, firefighters, clerk 
       typists and laborers . . . . [W]here Harrison across the 
       board has no black employees and where the total 
       work force in [the four-county area] has at least 
       214,747 black persons, disparity is at least suggested. 
 
Id. at 799.22 
 
But there are important differences between Harrison and 
this case. First, the statistical evidence in Harrison was 
extremely probative. Before suit commenced, no African 
American person had ever held a uniformed or non- 
uniformed municipal position even though African 
American representation among Harrison's private 
employers was 22.1%. Harrison, 940 F.2d at 796. 
 
Furthermore, the only evidence presented in Harrison 
were projections based on statistics; here there is direct 
evidence consisting of hiring percentages of African 
American applicants during the four years in which 
Bayonne removed its residency requirement. Statistics "are 
not irrefutable; they come in infinite variety and, like any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. In Harrison, the court apparently did not consider the impact of the 
civil service examination because the parties did not raise it. On appeal, 
Harrison argued: (1) that the relevant labor market should be defined as 
the entire State of New Jersey; and (2) that it had legitimate business 
justifications sufficient to satisfy its burden under Title VII. Harrison 
did 
not dispute the accuracy of the plaintiffs' statistical analysis. See 
Harrison, 940 F.2d at 799-800. 
 
                                18 
  
other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their 
usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances." International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United 
States, 431 U.S. 324, 340 (1977). In Title VII cases, we 
often rely on statistical evidence because direct evidence of 
the effect of a particular employment practice is not 
available. In Harrison, we concluded that the data 
presented indicated that among "the `vast black labor force 
in Harrison's labor market, there would be a large number 
of black persons qualified to serve and wishing to serve' in 
each category of municipal employment in Harrison." 940 
F.2d at 889. In this case, no projection is necessary 
because there is direct evidence of the impact of the 
challenged employment practice. Under the 1991 
stipulation, Bayonne removed the residency requirement for 
four years, and minority representation did not increase 
and even decreased for police officers. Faced with that 
record, we believe that the district court did not commit 
clear error in finding that the NAACP had failed to prove 
causation. 
 
The NAACP contends we should not consider the results 
of the four-year moratorium and the evidence that the 
"bottom line" racial statistics did not improve, citing 
Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). But Teal did not 
hold that the "bottom line" is irrelevant; it held that an 
employer cannot avoid Title VII liability by manipulating the 
"bottom line" to compensate for racial discrimination in 
hiring or promotions. In Teal, employees of the Department 
of Income Maintenance of the State of Connecticut sued 
their employer, alleging that a promotion-eligibility 
examination was racially biased. The employer, in order to 
compensate for the low percentage of minority employees 
who passed the examination, selected a disproportionately 
high number of those minorities for promotion. The Court 
held the high minority promotion rate did not negate the 
discriminatory impact of the examination. "The suggestion 
that disparate impact should be measured only at the 
bottom line ignores the fact that Title VII guarantees these 
individual respondents the opportunity to compete equally 
with white workers on the basis of job-related criteria." Id. 
at 451. 
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Teal suggests that a subsequent affirmative action 
program cannot "redeem" discriminatory conduct that 
produces disparate results. See Id. at 452 ("respondents' 
claim of disparate impact from the examination, a pass-fail 
barrier to employment opportunity, states a prima facie 
case of employment discrimination under S 703(a)(2) despite 
their employer's nondiscriminatory `bottom line,' and that 
`bottom line' is no defense to this prima facie case under 
S 703(h)"). Here, the district court found no evidence of 
either disparate impact or racial discrimination. 
Furthermore, the NAACP presented no evidence that 
Bayonne manipulated the "bottom line" results of the four- 
year moratorium. 
 
The NAACP's reading of Teal -- that we must ignore the 
bottom line -- is also inconsistent with Hazelwood and its 
progeny. Those cases appear to point to the "bottom line" to 
establish a prima facie case. Specifically, they state the 
"proper comparison [is] between the racial composition of 
[the at-issue jobs] and the racial composition of the 
qualified persons in the labor market." Wards Cove, 490 
U.S. at 650 (citations omitted). 
 
The plaintiff must, of course, do more than point to the 
"bottom line" to establish a prima facie case. The Supreme 
Court has held that a plaintiff must also prove causation. 
This was made clear when, seven years after Teal, the 
Supreme Court held: 
 
       a Title VII plaintiff does not make out a case of 
       disparate impact simply by showing that, `at the 
       bottom line,' there is racial imbalance in the work 
       force. As a general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate 
       that it is the application of a specific or particular 
       employment practice that has created the disparate 
       impact under attack. Such a showing is an integral 
       part of the plaintiff 's prima facie case in a disparate- 
       impact suit under Title VII. 
 
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657. The district court here 
concluded the NAACP's statistical evidence failed to prove 
how reinstituting the residency requirement would cause a 
decrease in minority representation. 
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In finding that the NAACP failed to show causation, the 
district court speculated that the civil service examination 
may be the cause of Bayonne's low hiring rate of African 
Americans. The court noted: "much is made of a 1996 
police employment examination, which has a small number 
of persons of . . . the black race, as being qualified, but that 
list was not prepared or administered, nor reviewed by the 
defendant." The NAACP itself acknowledged to the district 
court: "When the residency requirement was lifted, [black 
applicants] were knocked out by the [police] exam. We 
believe this also occurred in the fire exam. . . . The test is 
administered by the Department of Personnel. We are not 
asking the Court to do anything about the test." J.A. at 
1.66. 
 
The district court found the NAACP failed to furnish 
evidence of a causal relationship between the residency 
requirement and the disparity in hiring. As we have 
discussed, the evidence presented -- that the percentage of 
African American municipal employees did not increase 
during the four-year moratorium and even decreased for 
police officers -- indicates that the district court did not 
commit clear error when it found insufficient evidence of 
causation. See Vulcan, 832 F.2d at 816 (finding district 
court did not commit clear error when it found statistical 
evidence flawed and unconvincing). 
 
IV. 
 
As we have noted, Bayonne hires employees for both 
competitive and non-competitive jobs. The district court 
focused its analysis almost entirely on hiring for 
competitive jobs. In granting Bayonne's Rule 52 motion, the 
court pointed to the civil service examination as the 
probable cause of the alleged disparity and noted that the 
examination is administered by the New Jersey Department 
of Personnel, not Bayonne.23 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. The court noted the test "was prepared by the New Jersey 
Department of Personnel, so to try to speak of visiting discrimination, 
whether intentionally or inadvertently or institutionally, at the doorstep 
of the municipality is not warranted factually, and that is why I dismiss 
this case, because there is nothing to support it factually." 
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But Bayonne hires candidates for the non-competitive 
jobs, like laborer and clerk typist, directly and appears to 
have complete control over the process. Candidates for 
these jobs do not have to take and pass the New Jersey 
civil service examination. Furthermore, the residency 
requirement for these positions was merely relaxed so that 
non-residents who were hired had to move into Bayonne 
within six months of their hiring. The district court made 
no separate finding as to what impact, if any, this had on 
Bayonne's hiring of African Americans and what impact the 
reinstitution of that requirement has had on opportunities 
for African Americans to work for Bayonne in non- 
competitive jobs. 
 
Under Rule 52(a), the district court shall makefindings 
of fact. Although there is some evidence on the record 
whether Bayonne discriminates in hiring non-competitive 
employees, the district court made no findings. On this 
record, we are unable to determine whether the NAACP has 
established a prima facie case of discrimination under Title 
VII in the City's hiring of non-competitive employees. We 
will remand this matter to the district court. 
 
V. 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, reverse 
in part, and remand for proceedings consistent with this 
opinion. 
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